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DID THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
REPEAL THE FIRST? 
Jed Rubenfeld* 
To get right to the point: Mr. Hacker does not disagree that the 
Establishment Clause would, in the absence of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, have prohibited Congress from passing a nationwide 
religion law like RFRA. He believes, however, that the Fourteenth 
Amendment has in part repealed the First. 
Of course, he doesn't want to say repealed. The language of re­
peal is not pleasant to the ears of those who would like to forget 
about First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism. The Four­
teenth Amendment did not "repeal any aspect of the text of the 
[Establishment] Clause," Hacker says, but only "change[d] pro­
foundly the meaning of [its] words."1 If, however, statute A means 
x and y, and statute B (enacted later) provides "x shall no longer be 
the law of the land," it makes no difference whether we say that B 
partially repealed A or merely "changed profoundly the meaning of 
[its] words."2 If, moreover, B does not expressly provide that x 
shall no longer be the law of the land-if, rather, there is merely a 
debated question of whether B should be so interpreted -then the 
question, for good or ill, is whether to read B as having partially 
repealed A. 
Dodging the word repeal, in other words, does not alter the 
question. No one had ever supposed that the Fourteenth Amend­
ment rescinded any of the foundational prohibitions laid upon Con­
gress in the First through Eighth Amendments. Until now -for 
this is just what Mr. Hacker says the Fourteenth Amendment did. 
Of course, it is possible to read the Fourteenth Amendment this 
way, but Mr. Hacker's arguments in defense of this position would 
have been far stronger if he had better appreciated the principles of 
religious liberty underlying -both in 1789 and in the present day 
-the Establishment Clause. 
* Professor, Yale Law School. AB. 1980, Princeton; J.D. 1986, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. Jonathan D. Hacker, A Response to Professor Rubenfeld, 96 MICH. L. Rav. 2129, 2137 
(1998). 
2. See id. 
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I. ANTIDISESTABLISHMENTARIANISM THEN 
The basic premise of Mr. Hacker's argument is an injustice he 
does to the First Amendment. As to the twofold core meaning of 
the Establishment Clause, there is no serious disagreement. The 
Clause prevented Congress both from establishing a national reli­
gion and from interfering with certain local religion laws, defended 
by their champions in the name of religious freedom but con­
demned by their detractors as establishments.3 The paradigm case 
here was the ecclesiastical system common throughout New Eng­
land, where each town was permitted to install by majority vote a 
Protestant ministry to be supported by tax revenues (with exemp­
tions provided for some dissidents).4 This second aspect of the Es­
tablishment Clause, prohibiting Congress from interfering with 
local pro-religion laws, is its antidisestablishmentarian component. 
Mr. Hacker evidently derived from the historical sections of my 
article a very disparaging view of First Amendment antidisestab­
lishmentarianism. He does not see in it any principle, not even a 
debatable principle, of religious liberty. Instead, the Establishment 
Clause, in its antidisestablishmentarian aspect, was merely a "sop 
thrown to" the unprincipled New England states. 5 
"[A]ntidisestablishmentarianism became part of the First Amend­
ment as a result of parochial Realpolitik and not a debate over the 
meaning and content of religious liberty."6 
Now, if we are dealing with a mere "sop," with mere ''parochial 
realpolitik," then of course we know in advance how a court should 
decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment repealed First Amend­
ment antidisestablishmentarianism. For if the battle is between 
America's constitutional principles of religious liberty on the one 
hand and mere politicians on the other, who can doubt the 
outcome? 
But this "parochial" view of the Establishment Clause is pure 
anachronism. Today, of course, the New England system seems 
scandalous. How can it be that New England, the very birthplace of 
American religious liberty, had in 1789 laws that strike us as obvi­
ous and reprehensible establishments of religion? We are not 
taught about such laws. We are not taught that the First Amend­
ment was centrally intended to protect them. We know nothing 
3. For a fuller discussion, see Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA 
Really Was Unconstitutional, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2347, 2351-56 (1997). 
4. See id. at 2352-54. 
5. Hacker, supra note 1, at 2132. 
6. Id. at 2135. 
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about First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism, and when 
we first hear of it, our instinct is to find it unprincipled, of no pres­
ent use or value, and certainly no part of the present Constitution. 
But it does great injustice to our history and to the Constitution 
itself to try to sever First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism 
from America's "debate over the meaning and content of religious 
liberty."7 Religious tyranny, for early Americans, was exemplified 
by the Church of England -or more ghastly still, by Popery - in 
which a central government dictated to everyone the terms of 
Christian worship. New Englanders had fought against the Church 
at tremendous cost, and what they had fought for was the right of a 
community of protesting believers to live by their own lights. 
The word community is central here. For many Americans to­
day, religious freedom is a wholly individual matter, an affair of 
private conscience. But New Englanders had fought bitterly for the 
right of religious communities to flourish freely, for the right of 
communities of believers to decide for themselves how to worship 
God without being subject to the religious dictates of a centralized 
government. (Think of the Amish for a contemporary example.) 
This was the "meaning and content" of the town-by-town religious 
system New England maintained. Most New Englanders vigorously 
denied that this system represented an establishment of religion. 
They thought of it as the achievement of religious liberty. And they 
had no intention of giving it up. As John Adams is reported to have 
said, "We might as well expect a change in the solar syst[ e ]m, as to 
expect they would give up their" local-autonomy church system. 8 
First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism was, therefore, 
every bit as much a part of the Revolutionary fight for religious 
freedom as was First Amendment anti-establishmentarianism. The 
point of First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism was to pre­
vent the new national government from interfering with local sys­
tems of religious liberty that -in their supporters' eyes - did not 
violate free exercise, that did not establish religion, but that Con­
gress might seek, following the powerful Virginia legislature,9 to 
abolish. 
In this way, prohibiting Congress from violating free exercise, 
from establishing religion, and from interfering with local pro-reli-
7. Id. at 2135. 
8. IsAAc BACKUS, Diary 1774, in 2 THE DIARY OF IsAAc BACKUS 895, 917 (William G. 
McLoughlin ed., 1979) (quoting John Adams). 
9. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 2352 n.30 (discussing Jefferson's bill "for Establishing 
Religious Freedom"). 
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gion laws, the First Amendment effectively guaranteed what the 
Federalists had said was already implicit in the Constitution: that 
"[t]here is not a shadow of right in the general government to inter­
meddle with religion."10 Actually, this Madisonian formulation was 
probably too extreme (for in exclusively federal domains - for ex­
ample, in regulating the sessions of Congress or in prescribing laws 
for the territories - the Constitution may have left Congress free 
to support religious practices), but the First Amendment undoubt­
edly erected a great wall of separation between Congress and reli­
gion. This wall of separation was maintained by two different but 
equally important buttresses: Congress could neither dictate reli­
gion directly to individuals nor dictate it indirectly by telling state 
or local communities what their religion laws would have to be. 
RFRA fundamentally breached this wall. It was an effort by 
Congress to dictate for the entire nation Congress's own definition 
of the terms of religious neutrality. Did the Fourteenth Amend­
ment empower Congress to do what the First Amendment founda­
tionally forbids? This question cannot be answered by dismissing 
the Establishment Clause as a "sop," as mere "parochial realpoli­
tik." It can be answered only after recognizing forthrightly that 
preventing Congress from dictating religion - even if Congress 
was dictating what it believed to be true religious neutrality - to 
state and local communities was one of the foundational principles 
committed to writing in the Bill of Rights. It can be answered only 
by appreciating the true significance of the Establishment Clause's 
wall of separation for America's constitutional principles of reli­
gious freedom. 
II. ANTIDISESTABLISHMENTARIANISM Now 
With these considerations in mind, I do not think we can answer 
the question the way Mr. Hacker would like. Tb,ere is, first of all, 
the very considerable burden of proof that ought to be borne by 
someone claiming that one of the prohibitions laid upon Congress 
by the Bill of Rights has been done away with by implication.11 In 
order for a court to conclude that a subsequent constitutional 
amendment has partially repealed any portion of the Bill of Rights, 
there ought to be a clear textual statement to that effect. Failing 
that, the later enactment should possess an unambiguous core 
10. James Madison, General Defense of the Constitution (June 12, 1788), reprinted in 11 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 129, 130 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977). 
11. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 2374-76. 
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meaning unequivocally dictating such repeal. Nowhere does 
Hacker confront this problem. 
Nor does Hacker confront the genuine threat posed even today 
by obliterating First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism. A 
Congress with the power to dictate rules of religious neutrality for 
all state and local communities is a Congress empowered to inter­
cede directly into the most private, fundamental domains of reli­
gious life. This is what RFRA's supporters never understood. Such 
a Congress could easily decide that current marriage law is too 
closely allied with majority religious traditions. Had Boerne12 come 
out the other way, what would RFRA's supporters have said if 
Congress later used its expansive Section 5 powers to legislate a 
Marital Freedom Act, requiring states to permit any person to 
marry any number of other persons? 
Certainly it may be said that the Court's decision in Boerne has 
avoided this result without necessitating any Establishment Clause 
inquiry. Maybe so. But my essay was written to show that laws like 
RFRA are unconstitutional period - because they violate the Es­
tablishment Clause - no matter how broadly Section 5 or any con­
gressional-power-granting provision of the Constitution is read. 
Perhaps the "proportionality" test laid out in Boerne13 will prove 
elastic. Perhaps a revised RFRA would pass muster under the 
Commerce Clause.14 Or perhaps the best reading of Section 5 
would give Congress considerable authority to impose on the states 
duties beyond those judicially deemed to be constitutionally man­
dated. My point is that whatever the scope of Section 5 - or the 
commerce clause - may ultimately prove to be as a general matter, 
Congress's power to intervene in religious matters is subject to spe­
cial, independent restrictions. Those restrictions were laid down in 
the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment did not re­
peal them. 
Thanks to the Fourteenth Amendment, states can no longer es­
tablish religion. But it is a misjudgment to suppose that this guar­
antee makes First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism 
irrelevant. For the antidisestablishmentarian principle never 
merely prevented Congress from abolishing state laws that were 
constitutionally deemed, or judicially deemed, to be religious estab­
lishments. It prevented Congress from deciding for the nation what 
12. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
13. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164, 2169. 
14. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 2348-49. 
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state laws excessively favor or disfavor any religion. Despite the 
Fourteenth Amendment, states must and may deal in all sorts of 
ways with religion, favoring some religious traditions or disfavoring 
them, so long as they neither establish nor prohibit free exercise. 
Current marriage law furnishes an excellent example. State em­
ployers making Christmas a holiday supply another. State family 
law, giving parents the right to inculcate into their children a partic­
ular religion, provides yet another. Congress cannot, under the 
First Amendment, intermeddle with these laws on religious 
grounds. 
Through RFRA, Congress attempted to impose upon all state 
and local law a national definition of the appropriate terms of reli­
gious neutrality. Congress may not pass such a statute without 
breaching the wall of separation between itself and religion erected 
by the First Amendment - a wall the Fourteenth Amendment 
gives us no reason to tear down and every reason to maintain. 
